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L I S T OF A L L P A R T I E S 
Plaintiffs named the Division of Juvenile Justice Services, Timothy 
McOmber, Carolyn Nay, and John and Jane Does 1-20 as parties to their 
original Complaint.1 Plaintiffs have not appealed the district court ' s orders 
dismissing those part ies. 
Carolyn Nay joined the Division' s first motion for summary for 
judgment that the district court granted on June 11, 2009. Plaintiffs have 
appealed from that order but they have not addressed any arguments 
toward Ms. Nay or her dismissal. See Aplt. Br. p. 3 and generally; Notice 
of Appeal, R. 500-501. Plaintiffs have therefore waived any claim they 
may otherwise have respecting Ms. Nay. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 
89, If 23, 16 P.3d 540 (issues not presented in opening brief considered 
waived); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), (9). 
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No. 20090931-CA 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF A P P E A L S 
RYAN MORFORD and LENE MORFORD, 
Plaint i f fs /Appel lants , 
vs . 
STATE of UTAH, DIVISION OF CHILD and FAMILY SERVICES, 
Defendant /Appe l l ee , 
ANSWER B R I E F 
The State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services (the Division) 
respectfully submits this answer brief. 
Jurisdic t ional Statement 
This Court possesses jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (West Supp. 2009). 
Issues Presented 
1. Failure to Comply with Appellate Rule 24. 
The rules of appellate procedure require adequate briefing. Plaintiffs 
appeal from grants of summary judgment , but they fail to cite to the district 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court record, to identify a single mater ial fact that Plaintiffs contend is in 
dispute, or to provide any meaningful legal analysis of their claims before this 
Court. Have Plaintiffs adequately complied with appellate Rule 24 such that 
their brief should not be stricken? 
Standard of review. 
This issue requires no review of the lower court decision and no 
s tandard of review applies. 
2. No Duty to Provide Reunification Services. 
U t a h ' s Juvenile Court Act separately addresses minors adjudicated by 
that court as abused, neglected or dependent from minors adjudicated as 
delinquent. The Act contains provisions respecting reunification services to 
parents of abused or neglected children, but not to parents of delinquent 
minors. Here, B.M. was removed from Plaintiffs' home and placed in the 
Sta te ' s custody because B.M. committed a delinquent act. Did the district 
court err when it found the Division had no duty to provide Plaintiffs with 
reunification services? 
Standard of review. 
Interpretation of a s tatute constitutes a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Blacknerv. Dep' t ofTransp., 2002 UT 44, Tj 8, 48 P.3d 949. 
-2-
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3. Immunity from Suit. 
Plaintiffs relinquished their parental rights to B.M. while he was in the 
Sta te ' s custody and confined to a residential t reatment center. Plaintiffs 
claim that they did so because the Division negligently failed to offer them 
reunification services. But Plaintiffs' alleged injury arose out of B.M.' s 
delinquent conduct and incarceration in a place of legal confinement, or 
alternatively, from an alleged negligent misrepresentation. Is the Division 
immune from Plaintiffs' negligence claim? 
Standard of Review. 
This issue presents the same standard of review as issue no. 2, above. 
4. No Contract Exists. 
Utah law makes clear that the burden of proving that a contract exists 
falls on the party seeking to enforce it. Here, Plaintiffs merely point, by 
name, to documents they contend constitute contracts between Plaintiffs and 
the Division. But Plaintiffs neither identify where those alleged contracts 
were introduced in the district court nor explain to this Court why those 
documents give rise to Plaintiffs' contract claim. Have Plaintiff met their 
burden here to show that a contract exists?2 
2
 Related to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is a claim that the 
Division violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. But Utah 
-3-
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Standard of review. 
The existence of a contract presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f 16, 84 P.3d 1134. 
Preservation of Issues 
The adequacy of Plaintiffs' brief presents an issue unique to this 
appeal and no preservation requirement applies. The remaining, substantive 
issues were raised in the summary judgment pleadings. R. 279-392; 410-490. 
The district court orders granting those motions and the court ' s final 
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice are attached at 
Addendum A. R. 393-394; 403-405; 492-498. 
D e t e r m i n a t i v e S t a t u t e s 
The following statutory provisions determinative to this appeal are set 
out verbatim in Addendum B. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-250 (West 2009); 
Id. § 78A-6-118;/*/. § 78A-6-312;/</. § 78A-6-401. 
law makes clear that in the absence of a contract, no implied covenants exist. 
See Savage v. Educators, Inc., 908 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1995) (an implied 
contractual obligation cannot exist in the absence of an express contract). 
-4-
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S t a t e m e n t of the Case 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs sued the Division for damages they allege to have suffered when 
Plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished their parental rights to a minor child 
whom Plaintiffs previously adopted. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiffs sued the Division and others in the Fourth District Court for 
numerous common law torts and for breach of a contract and an implied 
covenant of good faith. R. 1-25. The Division filed an answer, while other 
defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint. R. 69-102. Plaintiffs did 
not timely oppose the motion and the district court issued a minute entry, 
granting the same. R 119. Plaintiffs then filed an opposition memorandum, 
which the district court disregarded in its order granting the motion and 
dismissing the moving parties from Plaintiffs' suit. R. 136-139. Plaintiffs 
have not appealed from that order. See R. 500-501. 
The Division next filed a motion to dismiss all but Plaintiffs' negligence 
claim. R. 192-207. Co-defendant Carolyn Nay joined the motion and Plaintiff 
filed a memorandum opposing only the Division' s contract arguments . R. 
-5-
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208-212; 214-216. The Division submitted its reply and a notice asking the 
district court to rule without oral argument . R. 220-233. The district court 
did so on October 31, 2008. R. 236-238. The court dismissed the Division and 
defendant Nay from Plaintiffs' second, third, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth 
and tenth causes of action. R. 238. The court denied the Division' s motion 
as to Plaintiffs' contract claims, but dismissed defendant Nay with prejudice 
because there were no allegations that Ms. Nay entered into a contract or 
other agreement with Plaintiffs. Id. Plaintiffs also did not appeal from that 
order. SeeR. 500-501. 
Then in April 2009, the Division filed a motion and memorandum, seeking 
summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' negligence claim. R. 278-332. Co-
defendant Nay joined the motion and Plaintiffs' opposed it. R. 328-362. As 
before, the Division submitted its reply and a notice waiving oral argument . 
R. 369-392. In a June 11 order, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs' 
negligence claim against the Division and co-defendant Nay with prejudice. 
R. 393-394; 400-401. 
The Division next conducted discovery relative to Plaintiffs' two, 
remaining claims. In their response, Plaintiffs identified three documents 
that Plaintiffs contended represent written contracts: 1) Adoptive Foster 
-6-
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Agreement, dated July 28, 2004; 2) Adoption Agreement, dated July 2005, 
and 3) Adoptive Parent Statement of Disclosure. R. 428-431, 451.3 
On the close of this discovery, the Division filed an additional motion 
for summary judgment that Plaintiffs opposed. R. 410-460. There, the 
Division sought an order dismissing Plaintiffs' contract claims. Id. 
Plaintiffs responded, contending that Division service plans also provided 
written contracts to be enforced against the Division. R. 456-460. Plaintiffs 
did not attach any plans or cite to any express provisions in their opposition. 
Id. 
The Division submitted its final reply memorandum, after which the 
district court set the matter for a hearing and asked the parties to specifically 
address whether a single provision contained in the July 2005 Adoption 
Agreement gave rise to a contract claim. R. 461-469; 473-475. The Division 
submitted a supplemental memorandum. R. 476-490. Plaintiffs did not. 
The court heard oral argument on September 14, 2009, at the conclusion of 
which, Judge McVey granted the Division' s motion. R. 491. The district 
court entered its summary judgment order dismissing the remaining contract 
3
 Each document was unsigned by Plaintiffs, a fact the Division 
agreed to overlook for purposes of its motion for summary judgment 
only. R. 451, n. 1. For this Court ' s reference, each document is set 
forth in the attached Addendum C. 
-7-
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claims with prejudice on October 2. R. 492-495. The court entered a final 
judgment and order the same day. R. 496-498. 
Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal from the order dismissing their 
first cause of action (negligence) and from the order dismissing Plaintiffs' 
fourth and fifth cause of action (contract claims). R. 500-501. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
B.M. was removed from his biological parents and placed in the Sta te ' s 
custody in April 2002. R. 22-23. In June 2004, he was placed with 
Plaintiffs' in foster care. R. 23. 
At that t ime, the Division notified Plaintiffs that B.M. had been the victim 
of sex abuse and that B.M. had also been involved in a prior instance of 
sexual misconduct. R. 23. B.M. remained in Plaintiffs' care without 
incident, and Plaintiffs adopted him in October 2005. R. 21-22. During this 
t ime, Plaintiffs also became foster parents to another minor, J.G., who 
resided with Plaintiffs from February to November 2005. Id. 
Shortly after Plaintiffs adopted B.M., they discovered J.G. sexually 
abusing their minor daughter . R. 21. J.G. was removed from Plaintiffs' 
home that day. Id. During a subsequent interview, J.G. disclosed that B.M. 
had also engaged in sexual misconduct with Plaintiffs' daughter . Id. B.M. 
-8-
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too was removed from Plaintiffs' home and was placed in the Slate Canyon 
Detention Center pending arra ignment . R. 298, Affidavit of Timothy 
McOmber,1f 3. 
B.M. came before the Fourth District Juvenile Court for an arraignment 
hearing on December 13, 2005, where he admitted one charge of sexual abuse 
of a minor and was adjudicated by that court as delinquent. R. 308, Minutes, 
Findings and Order, entered December 13, 2005. The juvenile court placed 
B.M. in the Division' s interim, legal custody and ordered that he remain 
confined at the detention facility pending release to an appropriate setting. 
R. 307-308. The court continued the matter for further disposition. R. 307. 
At the disposition hearing held January 10, 2006, the juvenile court 
ordered B.M. placed in the custody and guardianship of the Department of 
Human Services for appropriate " out of home placement" and named the 
Division as the lead supervising agency. R. 298, McOmber Aff., \ 4; 306, 
Findings and Order, dated Janua ry 10, 2006. The juvenile court made no 
orders directing the Division to provide reunification services. See R. 306, 
generally. 
Following that hearing and according to guidelines published by the Utah 
Network on Juveniles Offending Sexually and input from Division personnel, 
B.M. was moved from Slate Canyon to Progressive Youth, Inc., for residential 
-9-
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sex abuse t rea tment . R. 297-298, McOmber Aff. at f^ f 4-5. Progressive 
Youth provided B.M. with an alternative to continued juvenile detention. Id. 
at \ 5. B.M. remained involuntarily placed at Progressive Youth unti l the 
date of his court-ordered release in July 2007. Id. at \ 8. 
B.M. next appeared in the juvenile court on April 12, 2006. R. 305. There, 
the court continued its prior orders and set B.M.' s case for review on July 12, 
2006. Id. On that date, the juvenile court received and reviewed a Court 
Report, prepared by a Division caseworker. R. 301-303, Review Order, dated 
July 12, 2006; R. 330-333, Quarterly Progress Summary Court Report, dated 
July 10, 2006. That Report set out several " Service Plan" objectives 
pertaining to B.M., but none pertaining to Plaintiffs. R. 330-333. The Report 
also indicated 
There recently has been a concern that [B.M.' s] adoptive family 
has disengaged with [him] and his therapeutic process. It seems 
that Mr. and Mrs. Morford are stepping back from the whole 
process involving [B.M.] to assess what level and how they will be 
involved in [his] life. [B.M.] had made a comment that he did not 
want to return home. It was reported that his comment was 
made during a time of frustration and [B.M.] has since stated 
that he does not wish to return home. This may be the catalyst 
for the Morford' s withdrawal . 
R .332 . 
At the close of that hearing, the court continued B.M. in the Sta te ' s 
custody for appropriate residential placement. R. 302-303. The court once 
-10-
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more made no orders respecting reunification services. See R. 302-303, 
generally. 
On July 19, 2006, the Division held a team meeting to address B.M.' s 
continued needs.4 R. 18, Compl, \ 45. Plaintiffs attended the meeting, after 
which they determined to relinquish their parenta l rights to B.M. Id. at \ 47. 
Plaintiffs formally relinquished their parental rights in a juvenile court 
proceeding held August 30. 2006. R. 292, Order of Term ination of Parental 
Rights', R. 293-295, Relinquishm ent of Term ination of Parental Rights. 
Therein, Plaintiffs stated that relinquishment was in B.M.' s best interest; 
that Plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily agreed to terminate their ongoing 
and residual relationship with B.M.; and that as of the date of the 
rel inquishment, all of Plaintiffs' " responsibilities for [,] obligations to and 
rights in connection with" B.M. were terminated. R. 293-294. 
Plaintiffs have never sought to rescind their voluntary relinquishment of 
or the juvenile court ' s order terminat ing Plaintiffs' parental rights to B.M. 
4
 Plaintiffs also attended team meetings held to discuss B.M. and 
his care on January 30, 2006 and February 21, 2006. R. 420-421. 
-11-
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SUMMARY OF THE A R G U M E N T 
The district court correctly granted the Division' s motions for summary 
judgment because the Division neither owed Plaintiffs a duty in tort nor 
under contract to reunify Plaintiffs with a delinquent child. Those orders are 
sound and should be affirmed by this Court. 
As a threshold mat ter , Plaintiffs have both failed to adequately brief their 
claims before this Court or to provide this Court with any case law 
warrant ing reversal as a matter of law. Plaintiffs have not shown that any 
mater ia l facts are in dispute. They have not shown that the Division owed 
them a duty under U t a h ' s child welfare laws to provide reunification 
services. And they have not shown the existence of a contract or any implied 
contractual obligations respecting those services. The district court orders 
granting summary judgment are sound and they should be affirmed. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. Plaintiffs' Brief Fails to Comply with Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Appellate Rule 24 sets out the component parts of a proper appellate brief. 
Plaintiffs' brief fails to comply with that rule in a number of respects. The 
Court may strike and disregard Plaintiffs' brief in total, Utah R. App. P. 
-12-
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24(k); see Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 2008 UT App. 207, n. 5, 186 P.3d 
1012; Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), or 
alternatively, the Court may disregard those portions of the brief that fail 
comply with Rule 24 and to presume, instead, the correctness of the district 
court ' s actions below. See Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. ofCal., 746 P.2d 1182, 
1185 (Utah 1987). 
Pert inent here, Rule 24 provides: 
(a) B r i e f o f t h e appel lant . The brief of the appellant shall contain 
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged 
and with parallel citations, rules, s ta tutes , and other cited 
authorit ies, with references to the pages of the brief where they are 
cited. 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue 
[presented for review] has been preserved in the trial court; 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions [and] s tatutes . . . whose 
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central 
importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the 
appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is 
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall 
be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of 
this rule. 
-13-
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(a)(7) A statement of the case A statement of the facts 
relevant to the issues presented shall follow. All s ta tements of 
fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by 
citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a). 
In addition, Utah law makes certain that an adequate appellate brief is 
one that goes beyond mere assertions and conclusory allegations. Instead, an 
adequate brief contains a thorough identification of the issues and thoughtful 
analysis of those issues, with citation to relevant legal authorit ies. See State 
v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 22, 128 P. 3d 1179; Kram er v. State Retirement Bd., 2008 
UT App. 351 ,1 22, 195 P.3d 925. 
Plaintiffs fail to comply with both the technical and substantive 
requirements of that rule. In part , Plaintiffs fail to state whether or where 
they preserved the issues presented on appeal. Plaintiffs have set out a 
section entitled " Statutory Provisions and Rules," but they have failed to cite 
to or provide a res ta tement in that section of the statutory provisions that 
Plaintiffs argue elsewhere in their brief. Plaintiffs have also attached a 
" Table of Authorit ies" to their brief, but that tables references none of the 
authorit ies that Plaintiffs cite. Instead, the table appears to pertain to an 
entirely different cause of action. 
-14-
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Substantively, Plaintiffs have challenged the district court ' s grants of 
summary judgment, claiming that a genuine dispute of the mater ial facts 
exists, but Plaintiffs offer no citation to the record below. See Aplt.' s Br. at 
pp. 3-5, and generally. And perhaps most glaring, Plaintiffs have failed to 
properly identify or to develop any analysis of the legal authority upon which 
they base their claims. But Plaintiffs merely point to sporadic provisions that 
they believe aid their appeal, without also informing this Court of the legal 
basis for those claims. 
Those reasons provide the Court with sufficient basis to strike and to not 
consider Plaintiffs' brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24. The Division asks that the 
Court make a searching review of Plaintiffs' brief and to strike it where 
appropriate. See, infra, Point IV. Elsewhere, this Court should limit its 
review to record facts that the Division has appropriately cited and which are 
supported by reference to proceedings in the district court below, see Koulis, 
746 P.2d at 1185, and to give credence to only those legal arguments which 
are accompanied by thoughtful analysis. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 22; Kram er, 
2008 UT App. 351,H 22. 
-15-
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II. The Division Did Not Owe Plaintiffs a Legal Duty and 
Their Negligence Claim Fails. 
The material facts are not in dispute and the district court ' s summary 
judgment dismissing Plaintiff s negligence claim should be affirmed. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Neither in the district court nor here on appeal have 
Plaintiffs made even the barest at tempt to dispute the Division' s s tatement 
of mater ial facts or to il lustrate the existence of other, factual disputes 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Instead, Plaintiffs make only 
unsupported, conclusory allegations that carry no probative weight and that 
cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. See Rawson v. Conover, 2001 
UT 24, | 33, 20 P.3d 876 (bald s tatements do not suffice to establish genuine 
issue of material fact); Schunphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 477-
78 (Utah 1996) (bare contentions, unsupported by specific facts raise no 
mater ia l fact as will preclude summary judgment) (citation omitted). 
A. The Division had no duty to provide reunification 
services on behalf of a delinquent child. 
Plaintiffs claim the Division owed them a legal duty to provide 
reunification services respecting B.M. But the Division urges that no legal 
duty existed. In light of this legal dispute, Plaintiffs claim that a genuine 
issue exists that is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs err. 
-16-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
" Duty is an essential element of negligence." Higgins v. Salt Lake 
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993), reh ' g denied. One party cannot be 
liable to another in tort absent a duty. Yazd v. Woodside Horn e Corp., 2006 
UT 47, | 11, 143 P.3d 283 (citation omitted). Moreover, the existence of a 
duty presents a legal question for the court to determine. Id. at f 14. Here, 
the Division possessed no legal duty to provide reunification services to 
Plaintiffs and their appeal thus fails. 
1. Plaintiffs Possess No Statutory Right to Reunification 
Services. 
U t a h ' s Juvenile Court Act is comprised of multiple parts that separately 
address minors adjudicated by that court as abused and neglected from 
minors adjudicated as delinquent. Pert inent here are Parts 3 and 4. Part 3 
speaks to the needs of abused, neglected and dependent children and outlines 
the rights and obligations owed by the Division to parents of the same. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-301 to -323 (" Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
Proceedings"). As to those children and their parents , subsection -312 
addresses whether and when reunification services are appropriate. Id. § 
78A-6-312. B.M. was adjudicated as delinquent, not abused or neglected, in 
December 2005. Accordingly, Part 3 is inapposite here. 
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By contrast, Par t 4 states that " [t]he processes and procedures described 
in Part 3 . . . are not applicable to a minor who is committed to the custody of 
the [Division] on a basis other than abuse or neglect and who [is] classified in 
the division' s management information system as having been placed in 
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent behavior or a s tatus offense." Id. 
§ 78A-6-401(l) (emphasis added).5 Instead, " [t]he procedures described in 
Subsection 78A-6-118(2)(a) [apply]." Id. § 78A-6-401(2). That subsection 
contains no provision for reunification services, but contemplates that an 
order vesting the Division with legal custody of a minor for reasons other 
than abuse, neglect, and dependency " may be for an indeterminate term." 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-117(2)(c)(iii)(A) similarly states " A minor 
who is committed to the custody of the Division of Child and Family Services 
on grounds other than abuse or neglect is subject to the provisions of Title 
78A, Chapter 6, Part 4, Minors in Custody on Grounds Other Than Abuse or 
Neglect, and Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 2A, Minors in Custody on Grounds 
Other Than Abuse and Neglect." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-250 states, in 
turn 
(2)(a) The processes and procedures designed 
to meet the needs of children who are abused or 
neglected, described in Part 2 and in Title 78A, 
Chapter 6, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect and Dependency 
Proceedings, are not applicable to the minors 
described in subsection (1). 
(b) The procedures described in Subsection 
78A-6-118(2)(a) are applicable to the minors 
described in Subsection (1). 
Id. 
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Id. § 78A-6-118(2)(a).6 Because B.M. was adjudicated as a delinquent child, 
Part 4 thus controls. 
In the court below, the parties focused on statutes governing abuse, 
neglect and dependency. Plaintiffs focused on Section 78A-6-3 12(2)(A)(I),7 
and the Division on Section 62A-4a-203(4)(b) (West 2009). That fact is 
inconsequential. This Court may affirm the summary judgment order on any 
ground available the district court, " even if it is one not relied on below." 
Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; see Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, H 10, 13, 52 P.3d 
1158 (court may affirm grant of summary judgment on any ground apparent 
from the record). 
6
 And like Part 4, Part 6 specifically addressees delinquency 
proceedings involving criminal offenses committed by minors. It too is bereft 
of any provision mandating or even describing discretionary reunification 
services. See id. §§ 78A-6-601 to-606 passim. 
7
 In addition to their claims under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312, Aplt 
Br. pp. 7-9, Plaintiffs contend that in the absence of a legal duty, the Division 
undertook a gratuitous obligation to provide reunification services. Id. p. 8. 
But see R. 330-333, Out of Home - Foster Care Quarterly Progress Summary 
Court Report, attached as Exhibit D to Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum. 
There is no evidence that the Division assured Plaintiffs that B.M. would 
return to reside with them. The only evidence of B.M.' s permanency goal is 
the court report itself. R. 330-333. And that report is unequivocal on its face: 
at such time as he was able, the Division believed that B.M. should either be 
reunified with Plaintiffs or be placed in the guardianship of relatives. R. 333. 
The mere fact that the Division stated a concurrent permanency goal 
disclaims any obligation on the Division' s part to reunify B.M. with 
Plaintiffs. Further, even had the Division agreed to provide reunification 
services to Plaintiffs as a gratuity, Plaintiffs voluntary extinguished that 
gratuity when they knowingly and voluntarily relinquished their parental 
rights to B.M. 
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Here, the undisputed record supports the district court ' s grant of 
summary judgment . B.M. was removed from home in April 2002 due to his 
biological pa ren t s ' abuse or neglect of B.M. R. 23. But he was removed 
from Plaintiffs' care in December 2005 due to B.M.' s own, delinquent 
conduct. R. 298, McOmber Aff. f 3; 333, Quarterly Progress Summary Court 
Report, If IV., dated 4/12/06; 425, Quarterly Progress Summary Court Report, 
f IV, dated 7/10/06. This distinction is material and compels this Court to 
affirm the district court ' s grant of summary judgment . 
Because B.M. was removed from Plaintiffs' home due to his delinquent 
conduct, not Plaintiffs' abuse or neglect of B.M., the Division had no legal 
duty to provide Plaintiffs with reunification services. Compare Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-6-312 to § 78A-6-401; see also id. § 62A-4a-250. In the absence of 
a legal duty, the Division cannot be liable to Plaintiffs in tort. See Higgins, 
855 P.2d at 235; Yazd, 2006 UT 47, f 11. The district court ' s grant of 
summary judgment is therefore sound, and this Court should affirm that 
court ' s dismissal of Plaintiffs' negligence claim. 
2. Plaintiffs possess no constitutional right to reunification 
services. 
Parenta l rights constitute constitutionally protected interests. See Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (parental rights constitute Fourteenth 
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Amendment fundamental liberty interest); In re. J .P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 
(Utah 1982) (recognizing similar interest under the Utah Constitution). But 
the issue here is not Plaintiffs' parenta l rights, but their claimed right to 
receive reunification services. On that point, this Court has previously held 
that " [reunification services are a gratuity provided to parents by the 
Legislature, and appellants thus have no constitutional right to receive 
[them]." State ex rel N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing 
State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State ex rel. 
L.D.S., 797 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)).8 
Because Plaintiffs possess neither a statutory nor constitutional right to 
receive reunification services. Their claim here thus fails. 
III. Plaintiffs Concede that the Division Is Immune from 
Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim. 
Even assuming Plaintiffs could demonstrate the existence of a duty, the 
Division possesses sovereign immunity from Plaintiffs' negligence claim. 
8
 Stare decisis also compels this Court to conclude that Plaintiffs 
possess no constitutional right to reunification services. In other parts of 
their brief, Plaintiffs acknowledge that reunification services constitute a 
" gratuity provided to parents," Aplt Br. p. 8. But without citing State ex rel. 
N.R. or State ex rel. L.D.S., Plaintiffs urge this Court to find that they possess 
a protected right to receive reunification services. " Those asking [the court] 
to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion." See 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). Plaintiffs have done nothing 
to meet that burden. Absent that showing, this Court must affirm the 
district court. 
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Utah courts take a three-step approach to determine whether the State 
retains immunity from suit. See e.g., Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, % 10, 212 
P.3d 547; Peck v. State, 200& UT 39, 8, 191 P.3d 4. Plaintiffs ignore the first 
two questions, but focus only on the third inquiry - w h e t h e r the Division has 
retained its immunity from Plaintiffs' second cause of action. Aplt. Br. p. 9-
10. That inquiry is dispositive and calls on this Court to affirm the district 
court ' s order dismissing Plaintiffs' negligence claim. 
Under Utah Code section 63G-7-301(5), the State plainly retains sovereign 
immunity " if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from" one 
of twenty enumerated fact pa t te rns . Relevant here are subsections (f), 
retaining the Divisions' s immunity in the face of" a misrepresentation by an 
employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional," id. § 63G-7-301(5)(f), 
and subsection (j), immunizing the Division when an injury arises out of" the 
incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other 
place of legal confinement." Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(j). 
U t a h ' s courts have broadly interpreted the phrase " arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from" and have found that it requires " only that 
there be some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury." 
Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, f 15, 48 P.3d 949 (citing Taylor v. Ogden City 
Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 163 (" term 'ar is ing out of . . . reaches further than 
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'caused by' " ) . The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that the State 
retains its sovereign immunity " when 'but for' the act covered by the 
[retainer], the harm would not have occurred." Hoyer, 2009 UT 38, | 25. 
Plaintiffs do not seriously analyze that authority; instead, they concede the 
Division' s immunity in two different ways. 
First, Plaintiffs agree that B.M. was incarcerated in a place of legal 
confinement as that phrase has been interpreted by U t a h ' s court; see Aplt. 
Br. p. 9, and they concede that their claimed injury resulted, instead, from 
another immune category - t h e Division' s alleged, negligent 
misrepresentations to Plaintiffs.9 See id. p. 9-10. Because Plaintiffs agree 
both that B.M. was " incarcerated in a place of legal confinement" and that 
Plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished their parenta l rights to B.M. " as result of 
misrepresentat ions," Plaintiffs concede the Division' s immunity from their 
9
 Not only does this concession give rise to the Division' s immunity 
under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(f), it raises an argument on appeal 
that Plaintiffs have waived. In September 2008, the Division moved to 
dismiss all but Plaintiffs' negligence claim, including Plaintiffs second, third 
and ninth causes of actions predicated on the Division' s alleged negligent 
misrepresentations. R. 192-207. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum opposing the 
motion, but addressing only the Division' s contract arguments and none of 
the Division' s immunity claims. R. 208-212. The district court granted in 
part the Division' s motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' second, third, sixth, 
seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth causes of action. R. 238. By failing to 
respond to the Division' s claim at that time, Plaintiffs have not properly 
preserved their ability to raise that issue here. Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 
45, Tf 16, 2 P.3d 442 (failure to raise argument in trial court precludes party 
from raising it on appeal). 
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negligence claim. Thus, even were this Court to find that the Division had a 
duty to provide Plaintiffs with reunification services and that it breached that 
duty by failing to offer those services, the Division is immune under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(f) and 0')- The Court should therefore affirm the 
district court order dismissing Plaintiffs' negligence claim. See Higgins, 855 
P.2d at 235;Bailey, 2002 UT 58, Iff 10, 13. 
IV- Plaintiffs' Contract Claims Fail as a Matter of Law. 
Long-standing Utah law provides that absent a meeting of the minds, no 
contract exists. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). That 
law also makes clear that the burden of proving that a contract exists falls on 
the party seeking enforcement. Id. Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Division 
entered into and then breached a host of alleged contracts to provide them 
with reunification services. Aplt. Br. p. 12. Plaintiffs neither cite to where 
those agreements are contained in the record nor explain how those 
agreements , or Utah law, supports their claim. The summary judgment order 
should be affirmed. 
Utah law maintains that an adequately briefed argument contains the 
appel lant ' s contentions and reasons with respect to the issues presented; it 
includes the grounds for review; and sets forth citation to the authorit ies, 
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statutes and parts of the record that the appellant relies on. -See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a) (9). To this end, Utah courts consistently hold that " to be 
adequate, briefs must provide 'meaningful legal analysis. ' " Lee, 2006 UT 5, 
\ 22. Moreover, " bald citation to authori ty" that is devoid of analysis is not 
adequate. Id. 
Here, Plaintiffs' briefing is wholly inadequate. Plaintiffs' contract 
claims are conclusory. They offer no citations to the record. They cite to no 
legal authority. And Plaintiffs give this Court no thoughtful analysis. In 
short, Plaintiffs' contract claims fail to meet even the threshold 
requirements of Rule 24. The Division therefore ask that this Court decline 
to address the merits of those claims and to uphold the trial court ' s grant of 
summary judgment . 
Alternatively, and should the Court find that Plaintiffs have adequately 
supported their claims, they nonetheless fails. 
A. The Division Service Plans Do Not Give Rise to a 
Contract for Reunification Services. 
Plaintiffs first allege that after B.M. was removed from them and placed in 
detention and then with Progressive Youth, the Division entered into and 
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breached a series of service plans with Plaintiffs.10 But Plaintiffs failed to 
properly identify or to introduce those plans in the court below or to point -
there, or on appeal - t o any case law holding that a service plan constitutes a 
binding contract.11 
Instead and without producing the alleged plans, Plaintiffs assert that 
they contractually obligated the Division 
1. " [T]o place B.M. in an 'adequately supervised, safe and secure . . . 
t rea tment facility." 
2. " [T]o use its 'best efforts to return [B.M.] to [Plaintiffs' ] home 
following his t rea tment , and to involve the [Plaintiffs] by giving and 
accurate status reports of [B.M.' s] t rea tment" 
and 
3. " [T]o promptly notify Plaintiffs of any incident or injury during 
[B.M.' s] t reatment plan." 
Aplt. Br. p. 12-13. 
But in their answers to the Division' s interrogatories, Plaintiffs described 
the support for each, respective obligation as 1) a juvenile court order placing 
B.M. in a level 5 facility and Plaintiff s belief that B.M. would be placed in 
10
 A service plan is a statutorily required treatment plan the Division 
creates for any child entering state custody. See Utah Code. Ann. § 62A-4a-
205 (West. 2009). 
11
 Moreover, the Division has searched for that authority and has 
found none. 
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that facility,12 R.285-286; Answers to State of U t a h ' s First Set of 
Interrogatories to Plaintiffs, Ans. to Int No. 6; 2) unspecified training that 
Plaintiffs received, a court report,13 and an undefined s ta tute , R.284-285, Ans 
to Int. No. 7; and 3) a Progressive Youth Supervisor, named Dawnya. R. 283-
284, Ans. to Int. No. 8. 
It is Plaintiff s burden to prove the existence of contractual obligations. 
Oberhansly, 572 P.2d at 1386. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to produce the 
alleged service plans or to show that the alleged obligations were contained in 
those plans. Plaintiffs have thus failed to defeat the Division' s properly 
supported motion for summary judgment and the district court ' s order 
should be affirmed. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, f 8, 177 P.3d 600. 
12
 The juvenile court did not order B.M. placed in a " level 5 facility," 
but that court directed the Division to screen B.M.' s case for " an 
appropriate out of home placement." R. 307-308. Plaintiffs have offered no 
evidence that Progressive Youth did not constitute such a placement. 
13
 Plaintiffs contend that because the court reports provided that B.M. 
had a concurrent permanency goal of reunification with Plaintiffs that the 
Division was contractually bound to see that that occurred. But B.M.' s 
concurrent " goal" was just that - a goal-neither a contractual obligation 
nor a guarantee. It reflects only the Division' s judgment that at such time 
as B.M. was rehabilitated and released from the juvenile court' s jurisdiction, 
he should be reunified with Plaintiffs, or be placed in an approved kinship 
placement. See also, supra n.7. 
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B. The Adoption Agreements Do Not Give Rise to a 
Contract for Reunification Services. 
Plaintiffs next claim that the Division breached various adoption 
agreements by failing to inform them of B.M.' s sexual history, and by 
interfering with Plaintiffs' parental rights. However, Plaintiffs concede the 
failure of their first claim and they fail to adequately support their second 
contention. The Division addresses those claims in reverse. 
1. The adoption agreement do not contractually obligate the 
Division to provide Plaintiffs with post-adoption 
reunification services. 
Without more, Plaintiffs assert that the Division possessed a duty under 
unspecified adoption documents to not interfere with their parenta l r ights. 
Plaintiffs claim that the Division breached those agreements by failing to 
offer them reunification services relative to B.M.' s delinquency action, and 
by manipulat ing Plaintiffs' into relinquishing their parenta l rights to B.M. 
The district court addressed only the first claim, but both claims fail, 
i. The adoption agreements. 
Plaintiffs do not distinguish among the various adoption agreements . But 
as the Division made clear in the district court, to the extent it is a contract at 
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all, only the document entitled " Adoption Agreement" pertains.1 4 R. 430. 
That agreement, dated July 2005, sets forth various responsibilities by 
adoptive parents and the Division " to help facilitate the successful adoptive 
placement." Id. And with the exception of paragraph 3 under the section 
entitled " Agency Responsibilities", that agreement applies to the pre-
adoption period only. 
Paragraph 3 states " [t]he agency agrees to provide information, services, 
and referrals during and after the supervision period to enable the family to 
be successful in the adoption." R. 430, attached as Ex. C to the Division' s 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment . Admittedly, that 
paragraph places some onus on the Division to cooperate with Plaintiffs to 
reach a successful adoption. But the paragraph places no obligation upon, 
nor any agreement by the Division to offer Plaintiffs post-adoption 
reunification services that the juvenile court did not order or that Juvenile 
Court Act does not require. See discussion at Point II, supra. Moreover, 
because Plaintiffs 
14
 The remaining documents address only the supervision and pre-
adoption periods and on their fact, they have no application here. R. 429, 
431. 
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have failed to point here or in the trial court to record facts that support an 
alternative interpretation of the agreement, Plaintiffs' claim thus fails.15 
ii. Plaintiffs' voluntary rel inquishment. 
Finally, in a single sentence argument , Plaintiffs claim that the Division 
breached the adoption agreements by improperly manipulat ing them into 
relinquishing their parental rights. Aplt. Br. p. 16. Plaintiffs do not detail 
the offending conduct, but elsewhere in their brief, Plaintiffs claim that they 
relinquished their parental rights to B.M. because the Division 
misrepresented B.M.' s progress and also that B.M. no longer wished to live 
with Plaintiffs. Aplt. Br. p. 15. 
Plaintiffs' first contention - t h a t the Division misrepresented the progress 
that B.M. was making in his residential t rea tment - s t a n d s alone. It has no 
support in the record and is insufficient to preclude a grant of summary 
judgment . 
But Plaintiffs' second claim - t h a t the Division misrepresented to them 
that B.M. did not wish to return to their home - is rebutted by the record. 
15
 Below, Plaintiffs had both the opportunity and obligation to point to 
facts sufficient to defeat the Division' s motion for summary judgment. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Were Plaintiffs unable to oppose that motion by 
affidavit or otherwise, Plaintiffs could have moved under rule 56(f) for a 
continuance of the summary judgment proceedings to permit them to obtain 
those facts by deposition or discovery. Having failed to do so, Plaintiffs 
cannot be heard to complain that a question of fact may yet exist. 
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Namely, one week before Plaintiffs determined to relinquish their rights to 
B.M., Plaintiffs were present in court when the juvenile court judge received 
and reviewed a court report, wherein a Division caseworker stated: 
There recently has been a concern that [B.M.' s] adoptive family 
has disengaged with [him] and his therapeutic process. It seems 
that [Plaintiffs] are stepping back from the whole process 
involving [B.M.] to assess what level and how they will be 
involved in [his] life. [B.M.] had made a comment that he did not 
want to return home. It was reported that his comment was 
made during a time of frustration and [B.M.] has since stated 
that he does not wish to return home. This may be the catalyst 
for the [Plaintiffs' ] withdrawal. 
R. 330-333, Quarterly Progress Summary Court Report, dated July 10, 2006. 
Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs relinquished their parenta l rights on August 
30. 2006 because that was their desire. R. 292, Order of Termination of 
Parental Rights', R. 293-295, Relinquishm ent of Term ination of Parental 
Rights. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have never sought to set aside that 
relinquishment or to reinstate their familial relationship with B.M.16 But the 
record facts make clear that Plaintiffs relinquished their parental rights to 
B.M. not because the Division tricked them into doing so, but because 
Plaintiffs believed that rel inquishment was in B.M.' s best interest; that 
Plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily made the decision to sever that 
16
 Plaintiffs did not ask the district court to reverse or to set aside 
their relinquishment in the action below, nor have they instituted any other 
action seeking relief from the order terminating their parental rights. 
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relationship; and that as of August 30, 2006 all of Plaintiffs " responsibilities 
for [,] obligations to and rights in connection with" B.M. were terminated. R. 
293-294. 
Having voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally relinquished any and all 
rights that they had as adoptive parents to B.M., Plaintiffs relinquished any 
contractual right they may otherwise have had under the paragraph 3 of the 
adoption agreement. By relinquishing their parenta l rights to B.M., Plaintiffs 
not only extinguished and waived any continued relationship that they had 
with B.M., they extinguished and thus waived any ongoing relationship with 
the Division as well. See In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, | | 310-31, 71 
P.3d 589 (a contract waiver occurs when a party intentionally acts in manner 
inconsistent with its contractual rights). 
2. Plaintiffs concede that the Division provided them with 
evidence of B.M/ s past history of sexual abuse and 
perpetration. 
Finally, at paragraph 11 of their complaint, Plaintiffs aver: 
[B.M.] was taken into DCFS custody in April 2002 . . . because he 
and other youths in his neighborhood were involved in an 
incident of sexual behavior. It was discovered that [B' s] brother 
had introduced him to such sexual behavior. 
R. 23. And at paragraph 12, Plaintiffs agree that at the time B.M. was placed 
in their care, the Division informed them about that incident of sexual 
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misconduct. Id. But on appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the Division breached 
several adoption-related contracts or documents when " the State of Utah 
failed to inform [Plaintiffs] of B.M.' s sexual history prior to the adoption." 
A p l t B r . p . 16. Plaintiffs' own complaint belies that claim. Having admitted 
that the Division provided Plaintiffs with information related to B.M.' s 
history as both a victim and perpetrator of sex abuse, this claim necessarily 
fails. The summary judgment must be affirmed. 
C. The Adoption Agreements Do Not Give Rise to Any 
Implied Cont rac tua l Obligations. 
Even despite the existence of a contract for reunification services, 
Plaintiffs contend that the Division breached an implied covenant or good 
faith and fair dealing. R. 7, Compl. \ \ 100-106.17 But in the absence of an 
express contract, no implied duties may stand. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 
908 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1995). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated a " duty of good faith and fair dealing 
is a contractual covenant[;] one that arises solely as an incident to contractual 
17
 In their opening brief, Plaintiffs mistakenly state that they possess 
an implied contract. See Aplt. Br. p. 17. Furthermore, a party a cannot 
enforce a contract against the state absent " very specific written 
representations by authorized government entities." Anderson v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm ' n, 839 P.2d, 822, 827 (Utah 1992). 
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obligations." Id. Because here, Plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of 
a contract with the Division, Plaintiffs have also failed to show they possess a 
cause of action for the breach of an implied covenant. The trial court ' s order 
dismissing Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is therefore sound. The Division 
asks this Court to affirm it. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the district court erred when it granted 
the Division' s motions for summary judgment . Those decisions were correct 
and the Division therefore asks this Court to affirm the orders granting 
summary judgment and the district court ' s final judgment and order 
dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 10th day of May, 2010. 
Bridget K. Romano 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellee 
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I certify that two copies of APPELLEE' S ANSWER BRIEF was sent by 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 10th day of May, 2010 to the following: 
Ron Wilkinson 
Nathan Shill 
The Heritage Building 
815 East 800 South, Suite 101 
Orem,Utah 84097 
Facsimile No. 801-225-6041 
-35-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
